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volves criminal aspects, regarding lobbyists,4 foreign controlled military and
political organizations,5 and all Communist "front" organizations.8 The Fed-
eral Communcations Commission also requires that broadcasting stations an-
nounce the name of any person or organization that pays, either directly or
indirectly, for a broadcast.7 In this manner it is presumably possible for the
public to obtain some degree of knowledge regarding the underwritcrs of
these various groups or individuals.
A business utilizing the technique in hfonest competition-toward a legal
end- without attempting to directly harm a competitor's business incurs no
liability.8 The end sought, or that 'which must necessarily result, must be
actionable. If the end result is the creation of a monopoly, the use of the
technique may be attacked as a violation of anti-trust statutes.9 In other
instances the use may create an actionable interference with prospective ad-
vantage,10 or it may be unfair competition."5 Another disadvantageous feat-
ure of the technique is the danger of running afoul of the Internal Revenue
Department. A business which takes a deduction for advertising or other
expense for the cost of a campaign of this nature runs the risk that such a
deduction would not be allowed as being an expenditure of money for an
illegal purpose. 1
2
It is apparent that if the technique is to be used effectively, the public
must remain ignorant of the true source of the information and propaganda
which is being disseminated. The public, however, is entitled to know the
true supplier of such information in order that they may make intelligent
appraisals of vital subjects, and may know when material put before them is
biased. As one judge pointed out, "[T]he only conceivable reason for
anonymity of political broadcasting" (or for that matter any dissemination of
information) "is a purpose of deception, and that purpose is enough to vali-
date a requirement of identification."3 It appears that the public interest
demands that a legislative attempt be made to relieve some of the more
flagrant abuses of the technique as represented by this case.
MICII.L E. MILLER.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - TORTS - LLBELrrY FOR NEGLIGENCE IN Ex-
ERCISE OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION. - Plaintiff's husband was jailed for
drunkeness and died of suffocation as a result of a fire during the absence
of the jailer. In an action for wrongful death against the city, the Supreme
4. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 841, 2 U.S.C. § 267 (1952).
5. 62 Stat. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2386 (B) (1) (1952); 52 Stat. 632 (1938),
22 U.S.C. § 612 (1952).
6. Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 786 (b) (1952).
7. 48 Stat. 1089 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1952).
8. It must be understood, however, that where a combination is formed it is the
actual result which governs and not the intent of the parties forming that combination.
See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
9. Cf. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Nash v.
United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
10. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Pommer, 199 Fed. 309 (N.D. N. Y. 1912).
11. Even though not amounting.to legal fraud. Cf. Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Algoma
Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
12. Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941); Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
855 (1930).
13. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 223
F.2d 531, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd for other reasons, 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
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Court of Florida held that a municipal corporation is liable for the torts of its
agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior when the agent is engaged
in a governmental function.' Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d
130 (Fla. 1957).
Liability is uniformly imposed on a city if the acts of the agent were com-
mitted when the agent was in the performance of a proprietary function;"
however, cities are immunized in the majority of jurisdictions if the act of the
agent was committed when the agent was in the performance of a govern-
mental function.,3 This rule apparently stems from the archiac belief that
"the King can do no wrong". Early cases reasoned that since a city is also
a sovereign, it too should be immune from suit.
4
Differentiation between governmental and proprietary functions of muni-
cipal corporations has offered one mode of restricting the doctrine." Some
states and the federal government have enacted legislation which waives gov-
ernmental immunity.a These statutes, coupled with the fact that many courts
are avoiding the rule, seem to indicate the current trend to find liability and
spread the loss over the entire populous. A type of insurance would provide
one methed of accomplishing this end. In the case of a small city it would
seem that insurance is essential to the payment of a large judgment. Instead
of a small community suffering the loss as the result of a large judgment, the
insurance would cushion the shock of a crippling financial blow.
Some rather incongruous results have evolved because of the immunity doc-
trine. It has been held that a city is liable for the negligent operation of a
fire truck, this operation not being a governmental function.7 In the same
state a policeman was in the exercise of a governmental function when he
assaulted and falsely arrested an innocent citizen.8 The courts have gone so
far as to suggest that an employee of a city, acting in a governmental capa-
city, is not actually an agent of a city, but of the public and therefore the
doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable.9
Other countries which have waived immunity arc operating with little ap-
parent difficulty.I °  It follows therefore, that the American States should
have no fear in this regard. It is submitted that the rule is contrary to the
fundamentals upon which our Declaration of Independence is based and is
in conflict with our traditional concept of justice, that there should be a
remedy for every wrong. 1  WILL(AM D. YUILL.
1. Tallahassee v. Fortune. 3 Fla. 19 (1850) (The court relied on this case which
held a city liable for the act of an agent when he was engaged in a governmental
function, and thereby felt justified in its apparent contravention of stare decisis.).
2. E.g., Armstrong v. Philadelphia, 249 Pa. 39, 94 Atl. 455 (1915) Reversed on
other grounds.
3. See MeSheridan v. City of Talladega, 243 Ala. 162, 8 So. 2d 831 (1942); Dar-
gan v. Mobile, 31 Ala. 469 (1856); Trammell v. Russellville, 34 Ark. 105 (1877); llol-
gerson v. City of Devils Lake, 63 N.D. 155, 246 N.W. 641 (1933); Hanson v. Berry,
54 N.D. 487, 209 N.W. 1002 (1926); Betham v. Philadelphia, 190 Pa. 302, 46 At. 448
(1900).
4. See Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 Yale L. J. 1, 17
(1926).
5. See 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 53.23-53.24 (3d ed. 1950).
6. Federal Tort Claims Act; N.Y. General Municipal Law § 50-a to 50-d.
7. Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147 (1924).
8. Brown v. Town of Eustis, 92 Fla. 931, 110 So. 873 (1926).
9. See Williams v. City of Green Cove Springs, 186 Ala. 9, 65 So. 2d 56, 58(1953) (dissent).
10. Crown Proceedings Act, (1947) 10 & 11 Gen. 6, c.44 1 2.
11; See'Williams v. City of GreenCove Springs, 186 Ala. 9, 65 So. 2d 56, 57 (1953)
(dissent).
